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Abstract  
The Paris Agreement of 2015 brought drastic changes in key regime design 
features. In contrast to its predecessor, it follows a bottom-up approach of 
nationally determined contributions (NDC) by both developed and developing 
countries. This change from top-down obligations for selected countries to 
universal, bottom-up commitments remarked an important paradigm-shift in 
the international climate regime. However, negotiators cannot make 
concessions that are not reinforced by their governments. At the domestic 
level, policy makers are confronted with many different not seldom competing 
policy issues. Often, phases of higher public attention link to incisive ‘focusing’ 
events occurring outside the influence of the actors of a policy subsystem. 
These events sometise bring new topics on the policy agenda and jeopardise 
the status quo by strengthening the stakes of the political opposition. By 
analyzing the rise and fall of public attention to climate change in Switzerland 
in the past two decades (1997 to 2017), we aim to learn more about how 
international developments have affected the domestic policy discourse. 
Moreover, by closely investigating and comparing two crucial points in time 
(2007-08 and 2017), we strive to understand how these international 
developments have affected specific policy positions of core actors and how 
they have altered the constellations of prevailing discourse coalitions in the 
climate policy subsystem. Methodologically, we use discourse network analysis 
(DNA) to code and analyse Switzerland’s policy discourse on climate change. 
As a data source, we draw on three daily newspapers (“TagesAnzeiger”, “Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung”, “Le Temps”). Our results show that media attention rose with 
important events like the Bali summit in 2007, or prior to the climate conference 
in Copenhagen in 2009. It steeply decreased in 2008, when the outbreak of the 
financial crisis steered public attention towards economic topics and after the 
failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009. Moreover, our results show, that 
the Swiss policy discourse was less polarised in 2007-08 than in 2017. We find 
that in the first phase policy actors from all sides of the political spectrum often 
aggreed on the same climate policy concepts. In 2017, a persistent conflict 
lasted between a number of hardliners that rejected any further climate 
protection ambitions (headed by the Swiss People’s Party, SPP) and a number 
of pro-ecology actors that had a strong stake in the climate protection topic 
(e.g. the Green Party Switzerland and WWF Switzerland).  
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1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement of 2015 was a hallmark in the history of international 
climate change policy, due to drastic changes in key regime design features. 
Its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, imposed legally binding 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets only upon Annex I countries 
(i.e. OECD countries without Mexico and South Korea) and no obligations for 
non-Annex I countries (all other countries). In contrast, the Paris Agreement 
follows a bottom-up approach of nationally determined contributions (NDC) by 
both developed and developing countries. This change from top-down 
obligations for selected countries to universal, bottom-up commitments 
remarked an important paradigm-shift in the international climate change 
regime. However, the United Nations are a negotiation platform, not a world 
government (Obergassel et al. 2018, p. 12). This implies that negotiators 
cannot make concessions that are not reinforced by their governments and 
decisions made at the international scale must be translated into national 
policies. At the domestic level, policy makers are confronted with many different 
not seldom competing policy issues. Often, the level of public attention 
determines what topic successfully reaches the political agenda and what 
eventually enters the domestic policy process. Although not being a sufficient 
condition, higher public attention to a topic pressures policy makers “to do 
something” about it. In this regard, a vivid public discourse can be an important 
trigger for policy change. 
In the policy analysis literature, ‘focusing events’ (Baumgartner 2006; Birkland 
and DeYoung 2013) are often discussed as causal mechanisms for policy 
change. Frequently, these incisive events occurring outside the influence of the 
actors of a policy subsystem, so called ‘external shocks’, jeopardise the status 
quo by strengthening the stakes of the political opposition. Put differently, 
altered policy positions and power structures, paired with increased public 
attention, might induce a ‘window of opportunity’ for policy change to open. In 
this regard, policy discourses can be highly consequential for political 
outcomes. In this article, we strive to understand how important international 
events relate to an alteration of the level of public attention for climate change 
at the domestic scale. In addition, we aim to investigate how this raise and fall 
of media attention connects to a reconfiguration of the public discourse possibly 
creating important preconditions for policy change. 
4 
 
We selected Switzerland as a case study for this analysis for several reasons. 
Firstly, Switzerland is a small country emitting only around 1% of the global 
GHG emissions. In this regard, it does not belong to the major players in 
international climate change politics and it is not in the focus of the international 
community. Nevertheless, Switzerland tends to act as a forerunner and role 
model in the international climate regime. For example, the country was among 
the first to introduce a domestic GHG emission reduction target, a CO2 tax on 
combustibles, and pushed early for industrialised countries to support and 
finance adaptation in developing countries. The strong stake in climate 
protection measures is partly due to its Alpine geography that makes the 
country highly vulnerable to climate change impacts. But, also due to the fact 
that the country is aware of its dependency on other countries to act. However, 
Switzerland has also been criticised by non-governmental organisations for its 
low climate performance. Recently, the country only ranked ninth in the climate 
performance index issued by Germanwatch1. The reasons are high “grey” 
emissions, the tendency to buy certificates instead of national reduction 
measures, and the failure to regulate the transport sector effectively. 
By analyzing the rise and fall of the public attention to climate change in 
Switzerland in the past two decades, we aim to learn more about how 
international developments have affected the domestic policy process. 
Moreover, by closely investigating and comparing the policy discourse at two 
crucial points in time, we strive to understand how these international 
developments have affected specific policy positions of core actors and how 
they have altered the constellations of prevailing discourse coalitions in the 
climate policy subsystem. Eventually, this will allow us to draw conclusions on 
how decisive international events have affected domestic policies. 
For this purpose, we selected two brief, but particularly interesting phases that 
both showed high levels of public attention to the climate change topic, but 
differed with respect to the level of ambition of domestic climate policy. In the 
first phase, 2007-08, spurred by the promising outlook of an ambitious 
international follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, policy actors in 
Switzerland discussed policy options to strengthen climate protection 
measures. In particular, the Climate Alliance, a union of green parties and 
environmental organizations launched a public initiative aiming to uplift strict 
                                                            
1 Compare https://germanwatch.org/de/ksi 
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climate protection objectives to the constitutional level. In 2017, the climate 
policy network was far more conflictive. Although, Switzerland ratified the Paris 
Agreement in 2017, policy actors fighted over how to translate the obligations 
following from the ratification into national law. The cleavage divides a group of 
policy actors that rejects any further climate protection ambitions from almost 
all other actors, which support the ratification of the Paris Agreement and its 
implementation. 
Methodologically, we use discourse network analysis (DNA) to code and 
analyse the Swiss climate change policy discourse (Leifeld 2009). As a data 
source, we will draw on three daily newspapers (“TagesAnzeiger”, “Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung”, “Le Temps”). With the help of DNA, we attempt to identify for 
both phases the most important policy actors, policy concepts (i.e. policy 
positions or preferences), and discourse coalitions. The dynamic perspective 
permits to investigate if and how the range of policy concepts discussed, the 
involved policy actors, and coalitions have changed, over time. We conduct an 
explorative analysis of the phases using descriptive network analysis tools, 
such as centralization statistics and cluster analysis. 
Our results show that international developments triggered both media attention 
and the domestic policy process. Media attention rose with important events like 
the Bali summit and the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of 
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 and prior to the 
climate conference in Copenhagen. It steeply decreased in 2008, when the 
outbreak of the financial crisis steered public attention towards economic topics 
and after the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009. These events were 
decisive external shocks to the policy subsystem, as they changed the 
configuration of the policy discourse. Specifically, our results show, that the 
Swiss climate policy discourse was less polarised in 2007-08 than in 2017. We 
argue that this lower level of polarisation is a result of the overall greater 
enthusiasm for climate protection triggered by the promising developments at 
international scale. In particular, the events in 2007 (Bali summit, AR4) opened 
a window of opportunity for policy change to strengthen Switzerland’s climate 
change policy. In contrast, in 2017, the persistent conflict, which lasted between 
a number of hardliners that rejected any further climate protection ambitions 
(headed by the Swiss People’s Party, SPP) and a number of pro-ecology actors 
that had a strong stake in the climate protection topic (e.g. the Green Party 
Switzerland, GPS), is a consequence of the stalemate at interantional scale. 
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Therefore, the failure of the Copenhagen conference and the outbreak of the 
financial crisis signifcantly affected Switzerland’s climate policy subsystem and 
closed the window of opportunity for an ambitious climate policy. 
7 
 
2. Explaining policy change 
Studying and understanding the factors, triggering policy change, is key to policy 
analysis. Policy change is defined as the adjustment of laws, regulations, plans, 
programs, or even specific policy instruments (Knill and Tosun 2012; Ingold et 
al. 2016). It is an interesting subject of study for three main reasons. First, policy 
change is a rare phenomenon and policy stability with only iterative alterations 
is much more common (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Hence, researchers have 
the possibility to compare these rare incidents over time, to understand more 
about causal mechanisms driving policy change (Nohrstedt et al. forthcoming). 
Second, if there is a new societal problem that reaches the political agenda, 
there will be new ways of tackling it. It is these new approaches that are of 
interest to policy researchers (Sager et al. 2018). Finally, there are different 
streams of literature explaining policy change in different ways (Sabatier and 
Weible 2014). 
2.1 External shocks and focusing events 
A prominent hypothesis to explain policy change are shocks (or other factors) 
that are external to a policy subsystem, meaning that they are outside the control 
of subsystem participants (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993; Birkland 1997; Kingdon 1995). These external shocks are 
sometimes also called focusing events. They are focusing, as they are with 
respect to their magnitude and their timing in the policy process very much to 
the point. As a result, these events are able to cause policy change or even alter 
predominant paradigms (Birkland 1997). Focusing events can be catastrophes 
like severe flooding, famines, financial crisis, and so on (e.g. Birkland 2015). 
But, it may be also sudden and drastic changes in other policy fields or on other 
levels of the political system, like for example a budget shutdown, a resignation 
of a high-level official, a major political scandal, etc. causing policy or paradigm 
change (Walgrave and Varone 2008; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
It is important to note here, that external shocks or focusing events need 
enabling factors to cause policy change, including an increased public or 
political attention, an agenda change, a redistribution of coalitions or resources, 
or the opening and closing of policy venues (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Hence, 
the underlying assumption is that these external shocks cause a disruption in 
the policy subsystem for example by shifting public attention and political 
resources towards a new policy issue or away from an established policy issue. 
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For example, a financial crisis may direct attention and resources away from 
environmental protection topics. Vice versa, a serious heat wave or flooding 
event might lead to rising public and political interest in establishing new and 
stricter climate protection policies. In that sense, focusing events can cause 
policy change in favour of or to the disfavour of a policy issue.  
An important intervening factor determining if a focusing event leads to policy 
change, is when it is able to affect political actors and their preferences (Weible 
and Ingold 2018). This has consequences for how actors behave in the policy 
process, with whom they alley or interact and what strategy they choose to 
design new policies or propagate the status quo. Following the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF), actors form coalitions of like-minded alters based 
on their political preferences and belief systems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Ingold 2011; Kübler 2001). When a policy subsystem has two or more 
coalitions, there are ideological cleavages that separate the coalitions. A 
focusing event may disrupt this setting of coalitions in a subsystem. New policies 
are possible, for example, because a traditionally weak pro change coalition is 
suddenly more popular or powerful, so that they are able to put forward their 
ideas and interests ultimately causing policy change in a subsystem 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009). Carried by a peak in public attention to the topic, the 
traditional balance of power between the coalitions in a subsystem is now 
changing. However, this can also happen, due to changing preferences in the 
pro status-quo coalition (Nohrstedt 2010). Caused by the focusing event, the 
members of the dominant status-quo coalition are subject to policy learning and 
as a result adjust their preferences (Moyson 2017). 
2.2 Discourses and discourse networks 
A policy discourse is defined as a verbal interaction between actors about a 
certain policy (Leifeld 2016). Policy discourse analysis has been well 
established in the past two decades (Fischer 2003). It pursues the fundamental 
assumption that the policy solutions to issues that have successfully reached 
the political agenda are not recognised and designed in a top-down manner. 
Rather, policy design is the product of a policy process that starts with the 
problem perception, and continues with formulation, implementation and 
evaluation, until it eventually restarts again (Howlett et al. 2009). Along this 
policy cycle, many different actors interact in a manner of bounded rationality. 
To account for this subjectivity, policy discourse analysis focuses on the problem 
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perception and interpretation of the decisive actors in the policy process, as well 
as on their policy preferences and beliefs. In this context, different research 
streams have established that look at the meaning of narratives and frames of 
interpretation in political decision-making processes (Shanahan et al. 2011; 
Hajer 1995; Schön and Rein 1994). Other scholars focus on the learning ability 
of political actors (Moyson 2017; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) or 
understanding processes in political negotiations (Barthe 2001). 
In the past decades, social network analysis has been established in policy 
science (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Knoke 1996; Fischer 2014; Ingold 2011). 
Policy network analysis assumes that policies are the result of non-random, 
stable interactions between public and private actors. About one decade ago, 
policy network analysis was married to policy discourse analyse, yielding policy 
discourse network analysis (see Janning et al. 2009). Discourse network 
analysis links actors, involved in a policy process, when they commonly support 
or reject a discursive element. Discursive elements are usually policy concepts 
reflecting a policy preference about how a certain policy should be designed 
(e.g. specific objectives, targets groups, policy instruments, etc.) (Leifeld 2016). 
This procedure is interesting, as it allows investigating political agreement and 
dissent in policy subsystem, without having to ask the involved actors, for 
example with the help of an elite survey. In addition, a policy discourse can be 
traced back along a policy process much more accurately than a survey would 
allow. Hence, discourse network analysis is a very useful tool to investigate the 
effects of focusing events on actor constellations in a policy subsystem over 
time.  
The literature offers no consensus on whether a discourse network is able to 
reflect policy change (see for example Tosun and Lang 2016; Leifeld 2016). Put 
differently, we are not yet sure, if a discourse networks reflects only politics or if 
it also mirrors real policy output. Nevertheless, investigating policy discourses 
by applying network techniques allows the researcher to see when new topics 
emerge or specific paradigms start to evolve or dissolve. If this is a reliable 
indicator of policy change, or how much policy as compared to politics a 
discourse contains, cannot be determined in this article. However, we are aiming 
to find first indicators for causalities between policy discourses and policy 
change, paving the way for more research in this important area. 
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2.3 Research design and theoretical expectations 
In this article, we aim to understand if and how important focusing events have 
triggered policy change in the climate policy subsystem in Switzerland. For this 
purpose, we first investigate the rise and fall of media attention for the climate 
change topic between 1997 and 2017. We set this development in context to 
important external events that had the potential of being a focusing event. We 
argue that international developments stimulated Swiss climate protection 
legislation over time. Specifically, we expect a number of crucial external events 
to be focusing for the climate policy subsystem by increasing public attention. 
We assume that these specific events are the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the 
publication of the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC and the Bali 
climate conference in 2007, the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, and 
the Paris Agreement of 2015. Conversely, we expect that with the outbreak of 
the financial crisis in 2008 public attention shifted away from climate change 
towards economic concerns. This decline was furthermore reinforced with the 
failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, which caused a wide 
disillusionment towards ability of the international climate regime to combat 
climate change. Based on these considerations we put forward the following 
theoretical expectations: 
Expectation 1a: In Switzerland, the media attention rose and fell with the 
emergence of focusing events. 
Expectation 1b: Media attention rose after 1997 (Kyoto Protocol), in 2007 (Bali 
climate conference, AR4), and in 2009 (Copenhagen climate conference). 
Expectation 1c: Media attention fell after 2008 (financial crisis) and after 2009 
(failure of Copenhagen conference). 
Moreover, we argue that the most decisive event was the failure of the 
Copenhagen conference to deliver a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol. 
On one hand, this event caused the drastic paradigm-shift in the international 
relations paving the way for the Paris Agreement. On other hand, the 
international fiasco spurred arguments of Switzerland’s opposition against a 
progressive climate change mitigation policy and united them. The pro-ecology 
coalition (left and green parties and NGOs) supported a very ambitious climate 
protection legislation to keep up with the Paris Agreement and a Swiss 
forerunner role. The pro-economy coalition (right wing parties and business 
sector) did not see the necessity of increasing climate protection efforts in 
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Switzerland, but disregarded them as being bad for the economy. We argue that 
prior to the financial crisis and failure of the Copenhagen conference the Swiss 
climate policy subsystem was less polarised, which opened a window of 
opportunity for major policy change towards a more ambitious climate protection 
measures, i.e. the introduction of a carbon tax on motor fuels. After the financial 
crisis and Copenhagen conference and with the paradigm-shift in the 
international climate regime, the subsystem became continuously more 
polarised, which closed the window of opportunity in the subsystem for policy 
change and let to a long phase of policy stasis, i.e. the introduction of a carbon 
tax on motor fuel was prevented. 
Expectation 2a: The climate policy discourse was less polarised prior to the 
Copenhagen climate conference and more polarised in the aftermath of its 
failure.  
Expectation 2c: While the events in 1997 (Kyoto Protocol) and in 2007 (Bali 
Summit, AR4) spurred Switzerland’s climate change policy (window of 
opportunity for policy change opens), the events in 2008 (financial crisis) and in 
2009 (failure of the Copenhagen conference) hampered policy change (window 
of opportunity closes).  
3. Data and methods 
The data collection encompassed two subsequent steps: searching and 
counting newspaper articles (media attention analysis) and the coding of actors 
and policy concepts to create a discourse network (discourse network analysis). 
For the first step, we counted the number of all articles published on climate 
change to analyse the development of the media attention from 1997 to 2017. 
For this purpose, we searched in three national newspapers for articles 
published on climate change2. Table 1 shows for all years the number of articles 
dealing with climate change and their share relative to the number of all articles 
that were published on any topic in these outlets. 
Based on these numbers, we were now able to determine the development of 
media attention on the climate change topic over time and to set this 
development in the context of important external events. The selected 
newspapers reflect important societal cleavages that are important for the Swiss 
                                                            
2 The search string encompassed climate change, global warming, climate protection, and 
climate politics and policy (German: Klimawandel, globale Erwärmung, Klimaschutz und 
Klimapolitik). 
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climate policy discourse: The left-liberal “Tages-Anzeiger (TA), the conservative 
“Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (NZZ), and the francophone “Le Temps” (TEM). 
Table 1: Number and share of articles dealing with climate change 
1997-2008 2009-2017  
Year Articles Share in % Year Articles Share in % 
1997 48(*) 0.05 2009 996(**) 1.19 
1998 111 0.10 2010 896(**) 0.99 
1999 96 0.08 2011 634(**) 0.64 
2000 122 0.10 2012 486(**) 0.53 
2001 228 0.18 2013 416(**) 0.53 
2002 158 0.13 2014 579(**) 0.74 
2003 185 0.16 2015 698(**) 0.87 
2004 282 0.24 2016 579(**) 0.99 
2005 531 0.43 2017 718(**) 1.45 
2006 648 0.47 - - - 
2007 196 1.51 - - - 
2008 1324 0.88 - - - 
Total 5699 0.38 - 6002 0.85 
Annotation: Year 1997 & 2009-2017 without Les Temps; (*) no data available, (**) no data 
collected 
The data foundation for the second step, the discourse network analysis, are 
the years 2007-08 and 2017. We selected those years for several reasons. As 
Table 1 shows, both 2007-08 and 2017 remark media attention peaks prior to 
the Copenhagen climate conference (1.88% in 2007 and 1.13% in 2008) and 
after its failure (1.45% in 2017). In 2007-08, the enthusiasm for implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol and even negotiating a follow-up agreement was high. In 
fact, in 2007 the international community settled on the Bali Road Map, which 
detailed on the necessary steps towards a follow-up agreement. In addition, 
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both the IPCC, for its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), and Al Gore, for his film 
“An Inconvenient Truth”, won the Peace Nobel Prize. The enthusiasm collapsed 
with the disastrous failure (Dimitrov 2010) of the international community at the 
climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 to settle on a new agreement. On 
the same time, the Copenhagen conference remarked a turn in the history of 
the climate negotiations and paved the way for the Paris Agreement of 2015. In 
small iterative steps, the international community negotiated a completely new 
climate protection approach that relied on bottom-up, voluntary GHG emission 
reduction pledges by all countries, instead of top-down obligations for 
industrialised countries, only. The year 2017 reflects the peak of this 
development so far, with drafting the Paris Rulebook as a first attempt to 
implement the Paris Agreement. For the creation of the discourse network, we 
significantly reduced the number of articles, as only a fraction of articles deals 
with the domestic climate policy discourse. Specifically, we used only such 
articles that state the opinion or policy preferences of collective, political actors 
like governments, administrative agencies, parliamentary actors, interest 
groups, civil society groups, private or public companies, or science (Coleman 
1974). 
We created the discourse network using the Discourse Network Analyser (DNA, 
Leifeld 2018) by assigning political statements to actors and policy concepts. 
For the first period, we identified 390 statements in 114 articles and matched 43 
policy concepts to 65 actors. For the second period, we identified 273 
statements in 39 articles and matched 37 policy concepts and 47 actors. The 
policy concepts are generalised policy preferences or beliefs with respect to 
climate change and climate change politics. These beliefs may reflect the policy 
core (e.g. “climate change as business opportunity” or “climate change is one of 
the biggest challenges of humanity”) or secondary aspects (e.g. “CO2 label for 
food” or “CO2 tax on combustibles”). Consult Appendix A for a complete list of 
political actors and concepts. 
After having assigned the political actors and concepts to statements, we are 
able to export and analyse our policy discourse networks. For this purpose, we 
use a combination of the R package “rDNA” and the Java-based DNA software 
tool (cp. Leifeld et al. 2018). This procedure has two main advantages. First, it 
ensures a high reproducibility, as all analytical steps are transparently saved in 
an R-file. Second, R offers a wide array of statistical methods, like the network 
visualisations, centrality measures, or cluster analysis.  
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Figure 1 shows three possibly types of discourse networks, which can be 
generated and analysed with “rDNA”: affiliation networks, actor networks, and 
concept networks. An affiliation network or two-mode network reflects the 
relation between the actors in a network and the policy concepts they support. 
That is there are two kinds of nodes (political actors and concepts), but ties are 
only between the different node sets, not among them. The ties in the affiliation 
network are displayed as the dashed lines in Figure 1. Affiliation networks are 
rich in information, but they are much more complex and much more difficult to 
interpret as networks that only contain a single type of nodes.  
Figure 1: Illustration of the discourse network model 
 
Annotation: Illustration following Janning et al. (2009) 
For large networks, it can be useful to reduce this complexity. One option is the 
transformation of affiliation networks to actor or concept networks. Both 
variations are weighted one-mode networks, as they comprise only of one kind 
of nodes (i.e. actors or concepts). In the actor network, a relation (tie) between 
two actors (node) means that they have one or more concepts in common. In 
the concept network, it means that two concepts are at least commonly 
supported or rejected by two or more actors. For our analysis, this means that 
the more policy concepts two actors have in common, the more similar is their 
policy preference towards the climate change problem. Vice versa, two policy 
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concepts are more closely connected to each other if a larger number of actors 
commonly support or reject them. 
To assess and compare the polarisation of the two discourse networks, we draw 
on analysing the level of cohesion and centralization of the actor and concept 
networks. We start by calculating two cohesion statistics, which refer to the 
macro level of the networks. To measure network cohesion (i.e. how knitted a 
network is), we use the density statistic. The measure reflects the number of 
present network relations (ties) relative to the maximum possible relations (the 
network is fully connected). But, for the sake of comparison, (the networks have 
a different number of nodes), it is advisable to also control for the average 
degree of the networks. This statistic can easily be computed by calculating the 
degree for each node and averaging these values be the number of nodes in a 
network (Borgatti et al. 2013). Higher levels of network cohesion mean that more 
actors commonly agree or disagree on policy concepts. We use the level of 
cohesion as a first indicator for the polarisation of the policy discourse. Higher 
levels of cohesion are associated with lower levels of polarisation. Lower levels 
of cohesion are associated with higher levels of polarisation. 
Next, we assess the level of centralisation or fragmentation of the networks. 
Specifically, we calculate degree centralization and betweenness centralization. 
The centralization statistics measure the extent to which single nodes dominate 
the network structure, based on their degree centrality3 (degree centralization) 
or based on their betweenness centrality4 (betweenness centralisation). Full 
centralisation implies that one actor connects to all other actors, there are no 
connections otherwise, and hence these networks resemble a star. The contrast 
is a network in which all nodes connect to all other nodes.  
Moreover, we compare the degree distribution of the concept networks for both 
policy discourses. We expect the more polarised network to reveal a left-skewed 
degree distribution, which means that a smaller number of policy concepts is 
commonly supported or rejected. Vice versa, we expect the less polarised 
                                                            
3 Degree centrality refers to the number of commonly shared agreements or disagreement an 
actor has. 
4 Betweenness centrality is often used to identify brokers, i.e. bridging actors or concepts in 
our networks. It is defined as the number of shortest paths between two nodes (actors or 
concept) including a third node. The more often this third node is the shortest connection 
between pairs (geodesic distance) of nodes, which are not directly linked, the higher its 
betweenness centrality network. 
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network to show a right-skewed degree distribution (a larger number of concepts 
is commonly supported or rejected).  
Finally, we analyse the configuration of the prevalent discourse coalitions in both 
policy discourses. For this purpose, we calculate network clusters by using a 
hierarchical agglomeration algorithm5 that identifies subgroups in a graph object  
by minimising the dissimilarity of the members of the clusters (Malika Charrad 
2017).  
4. Results 
The following chapter presents the results of our analysis. In the first step, we 
show how the media attention has developed between 1997 and 2017 in the 
context of important external, international events, as presented above. In the 
second step, we analyse and compare the two discourse networks focusing on 
the years 2007-08 and 2017. 
4.1 Media attention 
Figure 2 visualises the rise and fall of media attention to the climate change topic 
between 1997 and 2017. Interestingly, Switzerland’s media was rather oblivious 
of the climate change topic for a long time, although the roots of Swiss climate 
legislation dates back to the 1980s. Policy makers aimed to introduce a carbon 
tax on fuels to achieve better air quality, reducing forest dieback that threatened 
trees across Europe. Many stakeholders regarded the tax as an efficient policy 
instrument. At the same time, it was heavily criticised by the business lobby. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to introduce a carbon tax on fuels, the 
Federal Council (FC) changed its strategy by enlarging the target group of the 
clean air policy to a wide range of sectors. This step can be regarded as the 
birth of the CO2-Act (Kammerer 2018; Lehmann and Rieder 2002). 
Undoubtedly, the development of the CO2-Act closely related to the 
development of the international climate regime. The first version of the new 
climate protection legislation was supposed to implement Kyoto Protocol 
requirements. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was the first legally binding 
international agreement that obliged industrialised countries to reduce their 
emissions in the 2008-12 commitment period. Switzerland agreed to reduce its 
total GHG emissions by 8% as compared to emission levels in 1990 (FOEN 
                                                            
5 We used the “rDNA” to do the cluster analysis, which used the Ward.D2 algorithm by 
default.  
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2010). The Swiss CO2-Act focused on voluntary instruments, but also included 
a subsidiary carbon tax, which was only to take effect, when the targeted CO2 
emission reduction could not be reached. 
Climate change did not attract much public attention despite these domestic 
developments and important events in the international climate negotiations, like 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the adoption of the Marrakesh 
Accords in 2001, which spelled out rules to implement the Kyoto Protocol, or the 
withdrawal of the U.S. from the protocol. It was not until 2005 when media 
attention reached a first peak with Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
what resulted in the protocol eventually coming into force.  
At the domestic level, it became quite soon clear, that voluntary instruments did 
not suffice to reach the targeted emission reductions. While the federal 
government introduced a carbon tax on combustibles, skilful lobbying by the 
Petrol Union prevented the introduction of a carbon tax on motor fuels. Instead, 
the oil association promoted the introduction of the climate cent – a voluntary 
levy of 1.5 Swiss cent per litre petrol and diesel(Niederberger 2005; Stiftung 
Klimarappen 2013) 
Public attention peaked in 2007, when the IPCC published its Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) highlighting the urgency to take action to mitigate 
harmful climate change. At the same time, the international community met in 
Bali to negotiate a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. The Bali summit 
was very successful and resulted in the Bali Roadmap, which spelled out the 
next steps towards a new agreement that should regulate international climate 
protection after the commitment period of the protocol (2008-12) ended. The 
positive spirit of the climate summit in Bali in 2007, IPCC and Al Gore winning 
the Peace Nobel Prize, and the alarming Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of 
the IPCC (2007), laid a solid foundation for successful negotiations towards a 
follow-up agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol.  
Spurred by the enthusiasm of the international community to protect the global 
climate, the “Initiative for a Healthy Climate” launched by the Green Party 
Switzerland (GPS) and a number of environmental NGOs aimed to uplift climate 
protection legislation to the constitutional level. This endeavour and the need to 
create a new legal basis for the Post-Kyoto phase (Kyoto II) from 2012-20, 
prompted the Federal Council to formulate a proposal to revise the CO2-Act.  
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Once again, the federal government suggested the introduction of a carbon tax 
on motor fuels. For a couple of years to come the prospect of its successful 
introduction were not too bad. However, the enthusiasm was soon enough 
tempered by the international financial crisis of 2008-09, which directed the 
public and political attention towards economic issues. At the same time, a 
strong decline in media attention can be observed. 
Maybe related to the financial crisis, the Copenhagen climate conference in 
2009 failed to deliver a substantial climate protection agreement, due to a lack 
of international willingness to formulate legally binding emission reduction 
commitments (Dimitrov 2010). Particularly, emerging economies and 
industrialised countries fought over the distribution of duties and responsibilities. 
The developed countries increasingly criticised the overcome divide into Annex 
I countries with obligations and the rest of the world without any mandatory 
reduction targets. In the light of the financial tantrums at home and the changed 
development status of many former developing countries, many industrialised 
countries demanded emerging economies to be more engaged in climate 
change mitigation. The emerging economies, spurned these claims by pointing 
to the historical responsibility of the Global North.  
In Switzerland, both the financial crisis and the gridlock of the international 
negotiations strengthened the political opposition of an ambitious climate 
protection legislation and providing them with arguments for cutting back 
Switzerland’s climate protection ambitions for the sake of the economy. 
Eventually, the tax on motor fuels was banned again. 
While the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 and its failure to deliver 
a Post-Kyoto agreement, again attracted public attention, it did not reach the 
same level as in 2007. After 2009, media attention to the climate change topic 
continued to drop until it gained momentum again in 2014. After 2009, the 
international community started to reconsider the Annex I/ non-Annex I split and 
began to negotiate a new agreement. The Paris Agreement, despite its 
limitations (Dimitrov 2016; Brun 2016; Obergassel et al. 2016), is the result of 
this turn in the development of the international climate regime. Step-by-step, 
the international community negotiated new principles until it was able to agree 
on an international agreement that included all countries in 2015. Switzerland 
ratified the Paris Agreement in 2017, which made necessary the next revision 
to adjust domestic regulation to the new international obligations. A respective 
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process has already started in 2016. Recent developments however have 
shown that the political landscape strongly splits into hardliners from both sides 
of the political spectrum. Particularly, the ongoing conflict between the Swiss 
People’s Party (SPP) and the left and green parties circumvented the latest 
revision of CO2-Act. 
Although this analysis of the development over time does not allow identifying 
clear causal mechanisms explaining the rise and fall of public attention to the 
climate change topics, it still shows that the public discourse relates to 
international developments. This allows confirming expectation 1a, according to 
which the increase as well as the decrease in media attention directs at focusing 
events. Furthermore, we find partial evidence for our expectation 1b. Media 
attention rose steeply in 2007 (Bali Summit, AR4) and in 2009 (Copenhagen 
Conference), but not significantly after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997. Public attention to climate change started to increase only in 2005, when 
the protocol entered into force. Finally, we find support for our third expectation 
(1c). Media attention declined significantly during the financial crisis and after 
the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations.  
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Figure 2: Development of media attention over time (1997-2017) 
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4.2 Discourse network analysis 
We started the analysis of the two policy discourses by evaluating the 
polarisation of the actor networks. As discussed in section 3, we used a number 
of descriptive network statistics as indicators for the level of polarisation in the 
two networks. As Table 2 shows, the actor network of 2007-08 has a higher level 
of cohesion, as indicated by the higher density score and the greater average 
degree score than in 2017. This suggests that the policy discourse in 2007-08 
prompted a higher level of political consensus, as political actors, on average, 
shared policy positions with more actors than in 2017, i.e. commonly agreed or 
disagreed on policy concepts. We take this result as a first indicator for the policy 
discourse in 2017 to be more polarised than in 2007-08. The assessment of both 
degree and betweenness centralisation scores allows a similar conclusion. Both 
scores are higher in 2017 than in 2007-08. As argued in section 3, higher 
centralisation scores indicate that only a small number of political actors agree 
on policy positions (degree) or link political actors that do no share positions 
themselves (betweenness). The higher numbers in 2017, hence, point to a 
greater level of polarisation in the policy discourse, as there are less actors in 
“the middle” of the policy discourse sharing positions with actors from all sides 
of the political spectrum.  
Table 2: Actor networks 
Centralization Statistics 2007-08 2017 
Density 0.33 0.23 
Average Degree 18.03 10.65 
Centralization (Btw.) 0.15 0.28 
Centralization (Degree) 0.42 0.56 
 
Figure 3 further supports these findings. The histogram plots show the degree 
distribution of the concept networks for both phases. For the 2007-08 phase, the 
degree distribution is right-skewed. This means that more policy concepts are 
commonly supported by a larger number of actors. For the 2017 policy 
discourse, the exact opposite can be observed. Here, the degree distribution is 
left-skewed, which in turn means that a smaller number of concepts are 
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supported or rejected by many actors. Hence, in 2007-08 more topics reached 
a higher level of consensus then in 2017 pointing to a higher level of polarisation 
in the later phase.  
The network graphs in Figure 4 and 5 also support these impressions. The 
graphs present the actor networks for the two phases. The network graph in 
Figure 4 (2007-08) seems to be much denser and subgroups cannot easily be 
identified. The network graph in Figure 5 (2017) is rather sparse and we find 
economic actors clustering at the left hand side and environmental NGOs and 
other civil society actors on the right hand side of the graph. 
Figure 3: Histogram of concept degree distribution in both phases 
 
In sum, these findings support our expectation (2a) that prior to the financial 
crisis and the failure of the Copenhagen conference, the Swiss climate policy 
subsystem was less polarised than in 2017. The investigation of the prevailing 
discourse coalitions in the two phases will help us to make sense of this finding. 
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Figure 3: Discourse network of 2007-08 
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Figure 4: Discourse network of 2017 
25 
 
The dendrograph in Figure 6 shows three discourse coalitions prevalent in 2007-
08. The first coalition is best described as the “pro-ecology” coalition (displayed 
on the left hand side of the plot). It consists of science institutions, the Federal 
Department of the Environment, the Federal Office for the Environment, the 
Federal Office of the Environment, actors from the insurance and finance sector, 
both green parties (Green Party Switzerland, Green-liberal Party), and 
Greenpeace Switzerland. This coalition unites due to a support of the scientific 
findings of the IPCC and the belief that climate change is real and 
anthropogenic. They highlight the high vulnerability of Switzerland towards the 
impacts of climate change and the responsibility to act immediately. Moreover, 
they point to the historical responsibility of industrialised countries to act. At 
national scale, they pursue the introduction of an ambitious climate protection 
policy and demand a drastic reduction of domestic energy consumption. 
The second coalition is best described as “pro-economy” (right-hand side of the 
plot) and comprises mainly of business actors (e.g. economiesuisse, car 
importers), the actors from the agricultural sector, and the SPP. However, this 
coalition also encompasses the Federal Council and the Federal Parliament and 
with the relief organisations as an outlier. This coalition is glued together by the 
conviction that the best option to target the climate change problem are market-
based policy instruments, measures to increase energy efficiency, and 
alternative energy sources (like biofuels). Also, some actors in this coalition (like 
for example the SPP or the Federal Council) support the increased use of 
nuclear power plants as a solution to the climate problem. Also, these actors 
widely share the belief that climate change is also a development issue and a 
matter of coordination with the European Union. At the same time, it is important 
to them that Switzerland inhibits a leading role in this process to ensure that its 
interests are respected. 
Finally, we call the third discourse coalition “Broker Coalition” (in the middle of 
the plot), as it is constituted by variety of actors, which one would usually not 
expect to alley in the climate change policy subsystem. It consists of a number 
of civil society and environmental organisations, the Liberal-Democratic and 
Social-Democratic Party, and the Department of Home Affairs. This coalition is 
interesting, as it supports (or rejects) policy concepts that intuitively fit to both 
sides, i.e. the pro-ecology and pro-economy coalitions. Specifically, they support 
market-based policy instruments like a carbon and vehicle tax to reduce 
emissions, but reject regulations for being harmful to the economy. They are in 
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favour of a domestic reduction target, but demand that developing countries 
must get involved and formulate reduction targets themselves. In addition, they 
demand that international institutions must be strengthened. 
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Figure 7: Dendrograph of discourse coalitions in 2007-08 
 
Note: Dendrograph shows the result of the cluster analysis for the actor network in 2007-08. To identify clusters, we used a hierarchical 
agglomeration algorithm (Ward.D2). 
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The dendrograph in Figure 8 shows three discourse coalitions prevalent in 2017. 
The first discourse coalition, we call it “status-quo” coalition (right-hand side of 
the plot), comprises a group of hardliners that reject any further progression of 
Switzerland’s climate policy, among them right-wing parties (SPP, FDP, CPP) 
and business groups. They regard any further ambitions in climate policy as 
harmful to the economy and support the lowest possible GHG emission 
reduction target for Switzerland, which must be in any case lower as the EU 
target. In addition, they consider a fast phase-out of fossil fuels to be unrealistic 
and irresponsible with respect to securing sufficient energy supply. The 
strongest opponent, the SPP, even doubts that climate change is anthropogenic 
and rejects any further climate protection measures.  
The second discourse coalition comprises a mixed group of left-wing parties 
(middle), environmental organisations, administrative actors, and interestingly 
business actors. When we take a closer look at the policy concepts, supported 
by the individual members of the coalition, it becomes clear that this discourse 
coalition splits into an ambitious and moderate subgroup. The ambitious actors 
encompass the Federal Office for the Environment, left wing and green parties, 
as well as environmental organisations (e.g. Greenpeace and WWF 
Switzerland). The more moderate group is constituted by business actors (e.g. 
economiesuisse), the Federal Office for Energy, and a number of science 
institutions. They support a moderate GHG reduction target and greater 
flexibility regarding the fulfilment of emission reduction goals, like the possibility 
to compensate emission abroad and voluntary measures. Nevertheless, the 
coalition as a whole is united by the interest in revising the CO2-Act and 
agreeing on new and foreseeable policy objectives and instrument to implement 
the Paris Agreement, which is why we call them the “Pro-revision” coalition. 
Finally, there is a small group of renowned insurance companies and pension 
funds, which we call the “Pro-prevention” coalition (left-hand side of the plot). 
For this group, climate change is a real threat demanding preventive measures 
and risk assessment. In this context, green investment is discussed as a useful 
instrument to incentivise the business sector to show climate friendly behaviour.  
In sum, the discourse analysis has shown that they the outbreak of the financial 
crisis in 2008 and the Copenhagen conference in 2009 served as a focusing 
event in the policy subsystem. Not only they caused a steep decline in the public 
interest, but they also link to a change in the configuration of the policy 
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discourse. Specifically, our results show, that the policy discourse was less 
polarised in 2007-08 than in 2017. We found that in the first phase policy actors 
from all sides of the political spectrum more often agreed on climate policy 
concepts. In particular, we observed a large “broker” discourse coalition that 
united different actors and policy concepts, which are typically assigned to the 
‘pro-ecology’ side (e.g. strict targets, taxes) and to the ‘pro-economie’ side (e.g. 
concern for the economy). We argue that this lower level of polarisation in the 
policy subsystem links to the overall greater enthusiasm for climate protection 
triggered by the promising developments at international scale. As a result, in 
particular the events in 2007 (Bali summit, AR4) opened a window of opportunity 
for policy change to strengthen Switzerland’s climate change policy. 
In 2017, a persistent conflict lasted between a number of hardliners that rejected 
any further climate protection ambitions (headed by the Swiss People’s Party, 
SPP) and a number of pro-ecology actors that had a strong stake in the climate 
protection topic (e.g. the GPS). We argue that this domestic gridlock is still linked 
to the events in 2008 (financial crisis) and in 2009 (failure of the Copenhagen 
conference). The outbreak of the financial crisis shifted public attention away 
from climate change towards economic concerns. This decline was furthermore 
reinforced by the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, which 
caused a wide disillusionment towards the ability of the international climate 
regime to combat climate change. As a result, the subsystem became 
continuously more polarised with some actors that categorically rejected a more 
ambitious climate policy and others that wanted to put forward a progressive 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. This closed the window of opportunity 
in the subsystem for policy change and led to a long phase of policy stasis, i.e. 
the introduction of a carbon tax on motor fuel was prevented. 
In consequence, we find some first evidence that supports our expectation 2c.
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Figure 8: Dendrograph of Coalitions 2017 
 
Note: Dendrograph shows the result of the cluster analysis for the actor network in 2017. To identify clusters, we used a hierarchical agglomeration 
algorithm (Ward.D2). 
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5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This article investigated how important international developments have 
affected specific policy positions of core actors in the Swiss climate policy 
subsystem and how they have altered the constellations of prevailing discourse 
coalitions. In addition, we tried to draw some first conclusions on how decisive 
international events have affected domestic policies and policy change over 
time.  
We first investigated the rise and fall of media attention to the climate change 
topic in the past two decades; and we set this development in context to 
important international events. We started with the argument that Swiss climate 
legislation has always been stimulated by international developments. 
Specifically, we expected a number of crucial external events to increase public 
attention and the level of ambition in the climate policy subsystem. These events 
are the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4) of the IPCC in 2007, the Bali climate conference in 2007, the Copenhagen 
climate conference in 2009, and the Paris Agreement in 2015. Conversely, we 
expected that with the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 public attention 
shifted away from climate change towards economic concerns. This decline was 
furthermore reinforced with the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in 
2009, which caused a wide disillusionment towards the ability of the international 
climate regime to combat climate change. 
Our results widely support our expectations. We have found evidence that both 
media attention and the domestic policy process were triggered by international 
developments. Although this analysis of the development over time does not 
allow identifying clear causal mechanisms explaining the rise and fall of public 
attention to the climate change topics, it still nicely illustrates that the public 
discourse relates to international developments. This allows confirming 
expectation 1a, according to which the increase as well as the decrease in 
media attention directs at focusing events. Furthermore, we found partial 
evidence for our expectation 1b. Media attention rose steeply in 2007 (Bali 
Summit, AR4) and in 2009 (Copenhagen Conference), but not significantly after 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Public attention to climate change 
started to increase only in 2005, when the protocol entered into force. Finally, 
we found support for our third expectation (1c). Media attention declined 
significantly during the financial crisis and after the failure of the Copenhagen 
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negotiations. Moreover, this analysis showed that these two events can be seen 
as decisive external shocks to the policy subsystem as they were not only 
connected to a steep decline in public interest in the climate topic, but also linked 
to a change in the configuration of the policy discourse.  
Moreover, we argued that the most decisive event was the failure of the 
Copenhagen conference to deliver a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol. 
On one hand, this event caused the drastic paradigm-shift in the international 
relations paving the way for the Paris Agreement. On other hand, the 
international fiasco spurred arguments of Switzerland’s opposition against a 
progressive climate change mitigation policy and united them. The pro-ecology 
coalition (left and green parties and NGOs) supported a very ambitious climate 
protection legislation to keep up with the Paris Agreement and a Swiss 
forerunner role. The pro-economy coalition (right wing parties and business 
sector) did not see the necessity of increasing climate protection efforts in 
Switzerland, but disregarded them as being bad for the economy. Accordingly, 
we found evidence that prior to the financial crisis and failure of the Copenhagen 
conference the Swiss climate policy subsystem was less polarised (support for 
expectation 2a). We found that in the first phase policy actors from all sides of 
the political spectrum more often agreed on climate policy concepts. In 
particular, we observed a large “broker” discourse coalition that united different 
actors and policy concepts, which are typically assigned to the ‘pro-ecology’ side 
(e.g. strict targets, taxes) and to the ‘pro-ecology’ side (e.g. concern for the 
economy). We argue that this lower level of polarisation in the policy subsystem 
and explain this with the overall greater enthusiasm for climate protection 
triggered by the promising developments at international scale. As a result, in 
particular the events in 2007 (Bali summit, AR4). This opened a window of 
opportunity for policy change towards a more ambitious climate protection 
measures, i.e. the introduction of a carbon tax on motor fuels.  
After the financial crisis and Copenhagen conference and with the paradigm-
shift in the international climate regime, the subsystem became continuously 
more polarised. In 2017, we observed a persistent conflict between a number of 
hardliners that rejected any further climate protection ambitions (headed by the 
Swiss People’s Party, SPP) and a number of pro-ecology actors that had a 
strong stake in the climate protection topic (e.g. the GPS). In our opinion, this 
domestic gridlock is still linked to the events in 2008 (financial crisis) and in 2009 
(failure of the Copenhagen conference). The outbreak of the financial crisis in 
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2008 shifted public attention away from climate change towards economic 
concerns. This decline was furthermore reinforced with the failure of the 
Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, which caused a wide disillusionment 
towards ability of the international climate regime to combat climate change. 
This closed the window of opportunity in the subsystem for policy change and 
led to a long phase of policy stasis, i.e. the introduction of a carbon tax on motor 
fuel was prevented.  
Hence, this analysis provides some first insights on how altering policy 
discourses and policy change might be connected. As we have argued above, 
the literature offers no consensus on whether a discursive approach is able to 
reflect policy change (see for example Tosun and Lang 2016; Leifeld 2016). 
However, by investigating the policy discourse over time applying network 
techniques, we were able observe a change in policy discourse configuration 
that can be linked to policy output. If this is a reliable measure of policy change, 
cannot be determined in this article. However, we found find first indicators for 
causalities between changing policy discourses and policy change. These 
findings point to the necessity to conduct more research in this important area. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Actor list 
Table 3: Actors 2007-08 
Actor Alias Actortype 
Agro industry, domestic AGR-DOM Interest group 
Agroscope AGRO Science 
Avenir Suisse AVENIR Civil society group 
Cantonal government CAN Administration 
Car importer CAR Private company 
Christian People's Party CPP Political party 
Climate Alliance CLA Civil society group 
Climate Cent Foundation CCF Interest group 
Committee Popular Iniative For a Healthy 
Climate POP Civil society group 
Communal administration MUN Administration 
Construction industry, domestic STR Private company 
Consumer organization, domestic CON Interest group 
ETH Lausanne EPFL Science 
ETH Zurich ETHZ Science 
Economiesuisse ECON Interest group 
Ecos ECOS Science 
Energy industry, domestic ENE-DOM Private company 
FDEA FDEA Administration 
FDP. The Liberals FDP Political party 
Federal Council FC Administration 
Federal Office for Agriculture FOA Administration 
Federal Office for the Environment FOEN Administration 
Federal parliament PARL Parliament 
Financial industry, domestic FINANCE Interest group 
Food industry, international FOOD Interest group 
Green Party Switzerland GPS Political party 
Green-Liberal Party GLP Political party 
Greenpeace Switzerland GREEN Civil society group 
Inrate INRATE Civil society group 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC Science 
MeteoSuisse METEO Science 
MyClimate MYCLIMATE Civil society group 
Myblueplanet MYBLUE Civil society group 
NGO, domestic NGO-DOM Interest group 
Nestlé NESTLE Private company 
OcCC/ProClim OCCC Civil society group 
Oil Association OIL Interest group 
Pro Natura PRON Civil society group 
Push PUSH Civil society group 
Relief organization, domestic REL-DOM Civil society group 
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Schweizer Bauernverband FARMER Interest group 
Schweizer Lawinenforschungsinstitut SLI Science 
Schweizerische Energiestiftung SES Civil society group 
Social-Democratic Party SPS Political party 
Strasseschweiz FRS Interest group 
Swiss SWISS Private company 
Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil 
Protection and Sport DDPS Administration 
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA Administration 
Swiss Federal Department of Home Affairs FDHA Administration 
Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police FDJP Administration 
Swiss Federal Department of the Environment, 
Transport, Energy and Communications DETEC Administration 
Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and 
Landscape Research WSL Science 
Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE Administration 
Swiss People's Party SPP Political party 
Swiss Re SWISSRE Private company 
Swiss academies of arts and sciences ACADEMY Science 
The Graduate Institute, Geneva GRAD Science 
Tourism industry, domestic TOU-DOM Private company 
Tourism organization, local/regional TOU-LOC Interest group 
University of Bern UNIBE Science 
University of Zurich UZH Science 
Verkehrs-Club Schweiz VCS Civil society group 
WWF Switzerland WWF Civil society group 
World Economic Forum WEF Science 
Zurich ZURICH Science 
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Table 4: Actor List 2017 
Actor Alias Actortype 
Association of building technicians SUISSTEC Interest group 
Association of master builders BMEI Interest group 
Axa Investment Managers (AXA IM) AXA Private company 
Bourgeois Democratic Party (BDP) BDP Political party 
Car importer CAR Civil society group 
Christian People's Party  CPP Political party 
Christian Social Party CSP Political party 
Council of States SR Parliament 
EMPA Material Science and Technology EMPA Science 
ETH Zurich ETHZ Science 
Economiesuisse ECON Interest group 
Energy and Water Berne (EWB) EWB Public company 
Environment, Spatial Planing and Energy 
Committees ESPEC Administration 
Environmental committee against energy law ENVCOM Civil society group 
FDP. The Liberals FDP Political party 
Federal Council FC Administration 
Federal Office for the Environment FOEN Administration 
Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) FOPH Administration 
Federal parliament PARL Parliament 
Green Party Switzerland GPS Political party 
Green-Liberal Party GLP Political party 
Greenpeace Switzerland GREEN Civil society group 
Homeland Protection HOME Civil society group 
Landscape Protection LAND Civil society group 
Oeschger Center for Climate Research OCCR Science 
Oil Association OIL Interest group 
Pro Natura PRON Civil society group 
Publica PUBLICA Public company 
Sciencesindustries SCIENCEIND Interest group 
Social-Democratic Party SPS Political party 
Swis Pension Fund ASIP Interest group 
Swiss SWISS Private company 
Swiss Federal Audit Office SFAO Administration 
Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and 
Landscape Research WSL Science 
Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE Administration 
Swiss Insurance Association SVV Interest group 
Swiss People's Party SPP Political party 
Swiss Re SWISSRE Private company 
Swiss Trade Association GVS Interest group 
Swiss academies of arts and sciences ACADEMY Science 
Swisscleantech CLEANTECH Interest group 
Swissmem SMEM Interest group 
UBS UBS Private company 
University of Basel UNIBAS Science 
University of Zurich UZH Science 
WWF Switzerland WWF Civil society group 
Zurich ZURICH Private company 
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Appendix 2: Concepts 
Table 4: Policy concepts in discourse network of 2007-08 
Political Concept Orientation 
(Voluntary) CO2 compensation for air travel Switzerland 
Binding national emission reduction targets needed General 
CC as security/migration issue Switzerland 
CC as threat to the domestic economy Switzerland 
CC impacts uncertain General 
CC is (also) development issue General 
CC is one of biggest challenges of humanity General 
CC is real and anthropogenic General 
CO2 label for food General 
Carbon tax for agricultural sector (methane) General 
Climate Cent valuable contribution to reduce emissions Switzerland 
Climate change regulation as threat to economy Switzerland 
Coordination with EU climate change regime International 
Drastic reduction in energy consumption needed Switzerland 
Emission reduction through carbon sequestration Switzerland 
Energy efficiency as a main strategy Switzerland 
Federal climate protection measures sufficient Switzerland 
Full CO2 compensation obligation for new gas-fired power plants 
(otherwise carbon tax) Switzerland 
Higher fuel prices to reduce emissions Switzerland 
Historical responsibility of industrialized countries to act General 
Inclusion of carbon sequestration of forests into climate regime General 
Increasing responsibility of developing countries to act International 
Independent Swiss climate policy necessary/possible Switzerland 
International agreement needed International 
International carbon tax International 
Introduction of general energy levy General 
Limiting carbon offsetting abroad International 
Market-based solutions/instruments instead of regulation General 
More strict regulation of high emissions vehicles General 
New gas-fired power plants Switzerland 
New nuclear power plants Switzerland 
Positive appraisal of IPCC and its work General 
Promotion of alternative energies General 
Promotion of biofuels as alternative energy General 
Promotion of energy efficiency General 
Putting price on water General 
Regulation via motor vehicle tax General 
Scrapping premium as climate protection measure General 
Strengthening international environmental institutions International 
Switzerland particularly vulnerable to CC Switzerland 
Switzerland should take leading role in climate protection Switzerland 
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Technical solutions for climate change adaptation General 
Urge for immediate action (no wait-and-see strategy) General 
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Table 5: Policy concepts in discourse network of 2017 
Political Concept Orientation 
1 bn Dollar Climate Aid  International 
40% Reduction on Average Switzerland 
450-600 mil Dollar Climate Aid  International 
Alternative Energy General Statement 
CC Impacts are Severe and Observable General Statement 
CC as Business Opportunity General Statement 
CC as Insurance Problem General Statement 
CC as immediate Problem  General Statement 
CC is Real and Anthropogenic  General Statement 
Compensation of Fuel Imports  Switzerland 
ETS is not efficient Switzerland 
EU ETS in aviation EU 
Energylaw Switzerland 
Energystrategy 2050 Switzerland 
Expansion CO2 tax Switzerland 
Flexible Foreign Compensation Switzerland 
Fossil Energy Switzerland 
Green Investments Switzerland 
High Quality Certificates  Switzerland 
Increase CO2 tax Switzerland 
International ETS in Aviation International 
KELS (Climate and Energy Control System) Switzerland 
Less strict regulation on private cars as EU  Switzerland 
Link to EU ETS  EU 
Market-based Solutions/Instruments instead of Regulation  General Statement 
Measures to Prevent Climate Risks Switzerland 
Over 40% Reduction Switzerland 
Private Companies are Important Climate Protectors  General Statement 
Regulation is an Economical Threat  General Statement 
Revision of the CO2 Act  Switzerland 
Swiss Ratification of PA  International 
Switzerland is Vurnerable  Switzerland 
Switzerland should take Leading Role Switzerland 
Tax on Flight Tickets  Switzerland 
Trump Administration is a threat for CC  International 
Unter 40% Reduction Switzerland 
Voluntary Actions Switzerland 
 
